Efficiency in financial intermediation: Theory and empirical measurement. by Beck, T.H.L.
Efficiency in Financial Intermediation  












Abstract: Less developed financial systems are typically characterized by high overhead 
costs and interest spreads, reflecting inefficient financial service provision.  This paper 
discusses how market frictions give rise to a wedge between the savings and borrowing 
interest rates and illustrates the wedge with a spread decomposition exercise.  The paper 
then discusses different factors driving inefficient intermediation on the institution, 
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There is a large variation in financial intermediary development across countries: private 
credit to GDP was 173% in the U.S. in 2003, but only 2% in Mozambique.
1 This variation is 
critical to countries’ socio-economic performance: countries with higher levels of credit to the 
private credit as share of GDP experience higher GDP per capita growth and faster rates of 
reduction in the headcount, the share of population living on less than a dollar a day (Beck, 
Levine and Loayza, 2000; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2007).  However, economists and 
policy makers are not just interested in the amount of society’s savings that is channeled by 
intermediaries to the most deserving borrowers, but also in the efficiency with which this 
happens. The interest spread – the difference between lending rate and deposit rate – has been 
one of the most prominent measures of efficiency.  While interest rate spreads vary typically 
between two and four percent in developed financial systems, they often reach 10% and more in 
developing countries and are over 30% in Brazil (Laeven and Majnoni, 2005).  
This paper first discusses the theoretical background of interest rate spreads by 
contrasting a world with perfect information, no agency problems and no transaction costs with 
the real world with these different market frictions.  We then show the empirical relationship 
between efficiency and depth and breadth of financial system across countries. Next, we take a 
closer empirical look at the components of the interest rate spread, which will lead us to the 
driving factors behind efficiency of financial intermediation. We will distinguish between factors 
at the bank-, financial system and country-level. We conclude with policy lessons.  
 
                                                 
1 Private Credit to GDP is a standard measure of financial intermediary development and is the ratio of claims by 
deposit money banks and other financial institutions on the private, domestic non-financial sector relative to GDP.  2  
1. Interest spreads and credit rationing– theory 
Interest rate spreads, or imperfect channeling of financial resources from savers to 
investors, does not exist in a purely theoretical world characterized by the absence of transaction 
costs and asymmetric information.  In such a world, financial institutions would not be needed to 
mobilize savings and allocate loans, as savers would assign their savings directly to borrowers 
based on perfect knowledge of investment possibilities.  Access to external finance would be 
frictionless, limited only by the inter-temporal wealth constraint of the borrower, which would be 
known equally well and with certainty by both the lender (saver) and the borrower (investor).     
Investment decisions would thus be independent of financing and consumption decisions and 
based purely on the expected return of the investment project.  
Financial intermediaries and organized financial markets arise to alleviate market 
frictions, such as transaction costs, uncertainty about project outcomes, and information 
asymmetries.
2  These market frictions make it difficult to de-couple investment from financing 
decisions. The same market frictions` not only lead to a wedge between the interest rates that 
borrowers have to pay on their loans and the interest rate that savers receive on their deposits, but 
they also might result in credit rationing as we will discuss in the following. We will focus on 
three major sources of market frictions and their effects on spreads and credit rationing.
3 
Take first fixed intermediation costs. Transaction costs associated with screening and 
monitoring borrowers and processing savings and payment services drive a wedge between the 
interest rate paid to depositors and the interest charged to borrowers. However, these costs are 
not necessarily proportional to the transaction size. Fixed costs exist at the transaction, client, 
institution, and even system level: processing a loan application, screening borrowers ex-ante 
                                                 
2 See Levine (1997, 2005) for an overview of this literature. 
3 This is a shortened version of the discussion in Beck and de la Torre (2007) who also distinguish between 
payment-/savings and loan services and between idiosyncratic and systemic risk elements.  3  
and monitoring them ex-post entail costs that are, at least in part, independent of the size of the 
loan. Similarly, at the level of a financial institution, operating costs range from the brick-and-
mortar branch network to legal services and, to accounting systems and are largely independent 
of the number of clients or the size of their transactions.   Fixed costs even arise at the level of 
the financial system, including in terms of regulatory costs and the costs of payment clearing and 
settlement infrastructure, which are again, and up to a point, independent of the number of 
regulated institutions. Intermediation costs do not only drive a wedge between savings and 
lending rate, in a world with uncertain revenue streams they can also lead to credit rationing of 
borrowers with demand for small loans, as shown –among others – by Williamson (1987).  
Increasing transaction costs with smaller loan sizes increases the loan interest rate the lender has 
to charge in order to recover her costs and thus increases the probability of non-payment.  
Consider next constraints on the ability to reduce lending risk through diversification.  
Idiosyncratic, i.e. borrower-specific risk would in principle be diversifiable or insurable in a 
world with complete markets.  The limits to idiosyncratic risk diversification observed in the real 
world are, at least in part, a reflection of some form of market incompleteness, including the lack 
of sufficient markets for hedges and other insurance products.  If unable to diversify risks in a 
competitive market, risk adverse creditors include a risk premium in the lending interest rate, 
increasing the lending interest rate beyond the level necessary to cover the creditor’s marginal 
cost of funds plus the transaction costs discussed above.   
Consider finally agency problems due to information asymmetries. The inability of the 
lender to perfectly ascertain the credit worthiness of the borrower and her project ex-ante and 
monitor the implementation ex-post gives rise to the classical principal-agent problem and can be  4  
separated into adverse selection and moral hazard.
4 The inability to ascertain the riskiness of a 
borrower results in the interest rate serving as screening device, with higher interest rates 
rationing lower risk borrowers out of the market (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981).  While higher risk 
can be compensated by charging a risk premium, the usefulness of the interest rate as screening 
device decreases with higher premiums as the degree of riskiness in the pool of interested 
borrowers increases.  The absence of verifiable information thus can lead to the rationing of 
high-risk borrowers at a level below the equilibrium interest rate.  Second, high costs of 
monitoring over the life of the loan and of enforcing the loan contract in case of default result in 
moral hazard risk, the risk that the borrowed resources are not used for the original purpose, but 
rather for consumption or for riskier investments.  Again, while increasing the risk premium 
serves as screening tool, the interest rate’s usefulness decreases in the premium as the incentive 
to divert resources for riskier project increases; and this can effectively result in credit rationing.   
Figure 1 illustrates the non-linear relationship between the lending interest rate and the 
expected return for the bank. The horizontal axis denotes the nominal loan interest rate i, while 
the vertical axis denotes the expected return to the bank r. The 45 degree line denotes the linear 
relationship between nominal interest rate and expected return to the bank in a world without any 
market frictions. In the real world of market frictions, however, the expected return is not only 
lower than the nominal interest rate but also increases less than the nominal interest rate. 
Abstracting from the fixed component, transaction costs result in a first wedge illustrated by a 
parallel line to the 45 degree line, i.e. for a given interest rate i, the return to the lender is i-c, and 
where c are transaction or operating costs.  The non-linearities due to scale (fixed component of 
transaction costs) and agency problems are illustrated by curve I.    The nonlinear wedge 
                                                 
4 Empirically it is very difficult to distinguish between adverse selection and moral hazard, as discussed by Karlan 
and Zinman (2004).  5  
between the 45 degree line and curve not only implies that the default probability increases with 
the lending interest rate, causing r to rise less than i; it also implies that, as the lending rate 
increases beyond a given threshold, denoted in Figure 1 by i*, the expected return begins to 
decrease.  Thus, at (i*, r*), the marginal revenue to the creditor due to a contractual increase in 
the lending interest rate is fully offset by the marginal expected loss due to a higher probability 
of default.  Curve I, however, is drawn after subtracting from the interest rate any idiosyncratic 
risk premium.  Curve II, on the other hand, takes into account the risk premium and, hence, is 
always to the right of curve I, with the vertical distance between the two curves measuring the 
premium charged by creditors for non-diversifiable risk.  To the extent that the risk premium 
increases with the level of the lending rate (reflecting the increase in the ex-ante probability of 
default), curve II would be flatter than curve I and would have a lower flexion point, as drawn in 
Figure 1.  Note that the widening of the wedge between i and r as i increases is common to both 
curves.  This is because the probability of default rises with the lending interest rate, 
independently of the reasons (costs, risk-adjusted profits or risk premium) that push that rate up. 
Both curves have a flexion point and a downward-bending part; as interest rates rise beyond a 
threshold, the return to the lender decreases.   
The non-linear relationship between nominal interest rate and return to lender can result 
in backward-bending supply curve and credit rationing, as shown by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) 
and in Figure 2. . If the market-clearing interest rate i
M is on the backward bending part of the 
supply schedule, i.e. demand and supply schedules intersect at i
M>i*, there will be credit 
rationing, illustrated by z in Figure 2.  Rather than increasing the interest rate up to the point 
where demand is satisfied, lenders supply only up to the nominal interest rate i* and ration out 
borrowers who would have been offered loans in a traditional, price-clearing market. Together,  6  
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate that inefficiencies in financial intermediation lead not only to a higher 
spread between the return depositors receive on their savings and the rate borrowers have to pay 
for their loans, but also to lower depth and breadth of the financial system, as the riskiest and 
costliest borrowers are rationed out.  
 
2. Interest spreads and credit rationing – cross-country evidence 
  The previous section showed that a high wedge between deposit and lending interest rates 
is associated with credit rationing and thus a lower level of credit channeled to borrowers.  Can 
we confirm this theoretical prediction with data?  Since there are no good comparable cross-
country data on interest rate spreads, we turn to data on net interest margins and consider the 
empirical association of net interest margin as share of total earning assets, averaged over all 
banks in a country, with measures of depth and breadth of the financial system.
5  
Figure 3 shows the negative association of net interest margins with Private Credit to 
GDP for a sample of over 100 countries, with data averaged over the period 1999 to 2003.
6 This 
suggest that countries with lower net interest margins, thus less inefficiency and less deadweight 
loss for savers and borrowers, experience higher levels of financial intermediary development, a 
higher levels of savings intermediated to the country’s private sector. 
Figure 4 shows that countries with lower interest rate margins experience higher use of 
loan services, as measured by loan accounts per capita.  Here, we use data from a recent data 
compilation effort on the access to and use of banking services, by Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Martinez Peria (2007). While certainly a crude and imperfect proxy for the share of the 
                                                 
5 While spreads are the difference between ex-ante contracted loan and deposit interest rates, margins are the 
actually received interest revenue on loan minus the interest costs on deposits.  The main difference between spreads 
and margins are lost interest revenue on non-performing loans.   
6 All data are from the Financial Structure Database, as described in Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2000), 
unless otherwise noted.  7  
population with access to lending services, it is the most consistent currently available indicator 
of lending services use across countries.  Figure 3 shows that banking systems with higher 
interest margins are also characterized by lower outreach, i.e. by a lower penetration of the use of 
credit services in the economy. 
The negative association between the efficiency and the depth and breadth of financial 
intermediation shown in Figures 3 and 4 is a correlation rather than a causal relationship. The 
same inefficiencies impact the shape and flexion points of the interest-return curve in Figure 1 
and of the loan supply curve in Figure 2.  As the theoretical analysis already suggested, we have 
to look for common causes of both low level and low efficiency of financial intermediation.  
Before we do, however, we will take a closer look into the component of interest rate spreads, 
i.e. we undertake a statistical decomposition of the preferred measure of bank inefficiency.  
 
3. Decomposing spreads  
The decomposition of interest rate spreads can be a useful exercise to get to the factors 
that drive inefficiency and thus high intermediation costs in a banking market.
7  However, it 
should be stressed that such an exercise is not an end in itself, but rather a tool to find the 
underlying deficiencies in the environment in which banks operate and identify policies to 
remedy these deficiencies.  In the following, we will use the example of interest rate spreads in 
Kenya to illustrate this process; for more detail, see Beck and Fuchs (2004).  
We will start out with the cost of funding for banks, which in most cases is the weighted 
interest rate that banks pay on their deposits. However, not all deposits can be used for loans, a 
certain share has to be retained or deposited with the central bank as reserve requirements.  
                                                 
7 Throughout the paper, we abstract from non-interest revenue of banks, both directly related to savings and loan 
services and related to non-lending business.   8  
Further, in many countries with deposit insurance systems, banks have to pay premiums on their 
total deposits, which further add to the cost of intermediation.   Transaction taxes also add to the 
intermediation costs.  
Operating costs, i.e. transaction costs related to deposit and lending services make up the 
largest part of the spread in most countries (Figure 5).  As discussed in the previous section, 
these costs entail expenses related to individual transactions and customers, such a screening and 
monitoring of borrowers, or costs associated with savings or payment services, and general 
operating expenses related to branches, computer systems, security arrangements etc. In practical 
terms, these are wage costs, equipment costs (computers, vehicles etc.) and building costs 
(explicit or implicit rents). It is here that the productivity of financial institutions can make a big 
difference; how many clients are being served by one employee?  What is the deposit and loan 
volume per employee?  How many clients are being catered to by one branch? Or in more 
technical terms: how well does a bank use its inputs (labor, equipment, buildings) to produce 
output (loan, deposit and payment services).
8 Overhead costs relative to total assets vary between 
one to two percents in many developed countries to over five percent in many developing 
countries (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2000). In the case of Kenya, average operating 
costs are 5.6%, although there is a large variation across banks as we will discuss further down 
(Table 1). 
Provisions for loan losses are part of the interest rate spread as banks have to take into 
account historic losses when contracting new loans.  Historic and projected loan losses relate 
directly to the agency problems and the lack of diversification possibilities discussed above. 
Non-performing loans add to the cost of intermediation, because they represent opportunity costs 
in terms on non-paid interest revenue and because they tie resources that could otherwise be lent.  
                                                 
8 See Berger and Humphrey (1997) for an overview over this literature.   9  
It is here that sound credit policies and banks’ risk management come to play, as well as the 
contractual and information framework in which financial institutions operate and which we will 
discuss further down. 
The residual between the sum of deposit rate, i.e. the marginal cost of funding, reserve 
requirements and other indirect taxes, overhead costs and loan loss provisions, on the one hand, 
and the lending rate, on the other hand, are before-tax profits, out of which profit taxes have to 
be paid. While text-book models suggest that perfect competition should do away with any 
profits, one has to remember that growing banks need a certain minimum amount of profits to 
maintain their capital adequacy ratio, i.e. they need some profit to keep capital in line with a 
growing loan book. However, there are large differences across countries in profitability of 
financial institutions, which can either indicate large variation in competitiveness of banking 
systems or variation in country risk; especially foreign banks might insist on large returns in 
small developing countries to compensate for a high degree of country-level economic and 
political uncertainty. In the case of Kenya, we note a relatively high profit margin, but again with 
variation across different banks (Table 1).   
  
4. Explaining spreads 
While the decomposition of spreads allows us to identify the items in the banks’ balance 
sheets that make up the spread, this rather mechanical exercise is only the first step towards 
analyzing the driving factors behind high intermediation costs.  For the purpose of the following 
discussion, we will distinguish between factors at three different levels: the level of individual 
institutions, the level of the banking system and the country-level.  While such a division might  10 
seem somewhat artificial when it comes to certain factors, it is helpful in discussing policy 
options that help reduce intermediation costs. 
  Take first the level of the individual institutions.  The composition of both deposit and 
loan portfolio can be an important driver.  Lending to certain sectors, such as agriculture, is 
riskier and might imply higher costs. The absence of risk diversification possibilities can also 
lead to prohibitively high risk premiums and credit rationing.  Ownership is an important 
determinant of efficiency.  While government-owned banks are consistently found to have higher 
margins and spreads (Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven and Levine, 2004; Micco, Panizza and Yanez, 
2007) , there is mixed evidence in the case of foreign-owned banks:  while foreign-owned banks 
in developed economies are typically less efficient, foreign-owned banks in developing countries 
are often more efficient, i.e. have lower overhead costs and net interest margins.
9  Interestingly, 
the lower overhead costs and net interest margins are often in spite of higher wage costs due to 
expatriate salaries; this seems to be more than offset by a higher productivity.  This is illustrated 
in the case of Kenya.  While foreign-owned banks have higher overhead costs than domestic 
banks, they have lower interest spreads than government-owned banks and only somewhat 
higher spreads than private domestic banks. The difference is explained by the much higher loan 
loss provisions of government-owned bank compared to privately-owned banks, both domestic 
and foreign (Table 1).  
Bank size can also be a driving factor for intermediation efficiency.  Larger banks can 
enjoy scale economies by spreading the fixed component of transaction costs over more clients 
and over more volume of deposit and loans (Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven and Levine, 2004).  Larger 
banks might also be able to better diversify risk stemming from different sources, i.e. both from 
agency problems as well as from borrower-specific production risk.     
                                                 
9 See Clarke et al. (2003) for an overview.  11 
Consider next the level of the banking system.  Both ownership structure and size structure can 
have important repercussions here, too.  A large share of government-owned banks does not only 
drive up the average spread faced by depositors and borrowers, but through their dominating 
role, inefficient government bank can provide rents to privately-owned more efficient banks that 
charge the same spread while enjoying higher profits.  This does not seem to be the case in 
Kenya, where government-owned banks have actually the highest profit margins of all banks 
(Table 1); however, it can be argued that the rents provided by government-owned banks allow 
foreign-owned banks to be less efficient and less innovative in their quest to lower overhead 
costs. Strong entry by foreign banks, on the other hand, can put competitive pressure on domestic 
banks (Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2001).  Scale economies on the individual bank 
level also have repercussions on the level of the banking system.  On the one hand, small 
banking systems with a few large banks might be able to overcome disadvantages of small size.  
On the other hand, relying only on a few large banks might have negative repercussions for the 
competitiveness of the financial systems.  It is to note, however, that market structure indicators 
such as the number of banks, concentration ratios or Herfindahl indices are not very good 
indicators of competitiveness (Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven and Levine, 2004; Claessens and Laven, 
2004).  More important than the market structure is the contestability of the market, i.e. the ease 
with which new banks can enter the market.  This puts the focus on regulatory policies that 
critically influence the contestability of the banking system. However, it also emphasizes the 
importance of supervisory practices; allowing undercapitalized and fragile banks to compete 
with healthy can result again in rents for the healthy institutions, as is the case in Kenya, where a 
history of small bank failures in recent history has created mistrust by the public in small private  12 
banks, which in turn gives large foreign-owned banks a stronger market position than their 
market share and structural market indicators would suggest (Beck and Fuchs, 2004). 
  On the country-level, the contractual and informational frameworks and the 
macroeconomic environment are critical in determining intermediation efficiency. Financial 
contracts depend on the certainty of legal rights and predictability and speed of their fair and 
impartial enforcement and a more efficient contractual framework can have a dampening effect 
on several components of the intermediation spread (Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven and Levine, 2004; 
Laeven and Majnoni, 2005): it helps reduce overhead costs as the cost of creating, perfecting and 
enforcing collateral decreases; it reduces loan loss provision as better contract enforcement 
reduces incentives for borrowers to default willing full and increases the share that creditors can 
recover in case of default.
10 And it can reduce the profit margin by affecting competition: lower 
costs of creating and perfecting collateral can lower the costs of switching creditors and reduce 
hold-up of borrowers by the main creditor.  Similarly, improvements in the informational 
framework can reduce information costs.  More transparent financial statements and credit 
information sharing lower the cost of screening and monitoring borrowers, reduce adverse 
selection by making it more likely that lender choose plums rather than lemons, thus reducing 
future loan losses.
11  Sharing negative information on borrowers through credit registries also 
reduces the perverse incentive to willing full default on one’s commitments.  By allowing 
borrowers to build up “reputation collateral” in the form of a credit history, finally, credit 
information sharing can have a positive impact on competition, as borrowers are able to offer 
their positive credit history to other creditors. Macroeconomic instability, finally, can drive up 
                                                 
10 There is a recent, but large literature on the relationship between legal system efficiency and financial 
development, following the seminal work by La Porta et al. (1997).  For an overview, see Beck and Levine (2005).  
11 See among others, La Porta et al. (1997), Jappelli and Pagano (2002), Miller (2003), Love and Mylenko (2003).  13 
spreads as it exacerbates the information asymmetries discussed in section 1 (Huybens and 
Smith, 1999; Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven and Levine, 2004). 
  Country characteristics beyond the institutional framework, such as size and the general 
costs of doing business can be an important factor of the efficiency with which financial 
institutions operate.  Take first size. Many developing countries suffer from the triple problems 
of smallness: small clients, small institutions, and small markets. These diseconomies of scale 
and lower possibilities of diversifying risk lead to higher intermediation costs and can, as 
discussed in section 1, result in rationing of clients.  Figure 6 illustrates this by plotting net 
interest margins against the absolute size of financial systems in US dollars – countries with 
smaller financial system experience higher margins. Small countries should therefore put a 
premium on policies encouraging entry of foreign banks that are able to reap benefits of scale 
economies across subsidiaries in different countries, on integration of financial markets across 
countries, and on allowing their citizens access to financial services across borders. General costs 
of doing business constitute another country-level constraint and include high costs due to 
deficiencies in the transportation and communication networks and electricity provision.
12  
Inefficiencies in input markets, such as labor markets or telecommunication markets might drive 
up costs and impede innovation.
13   
 
5. Conclusions and policy lessons 
  Market frictions give rise to financial intermediaries and organized financial markets, but 
it is the efficiency with which financial institutions can reduce these market frictions that 
                                                 
12 Beck, Demiguc-Kunt and Martinez Peria (2005) find a positive cross-country association of geographic branch 
and ATM penetration with rail and communication infrastructure. 
13 See for example discussion on South Africa (World Bank, 2004), and the discussion in Claessens, Dobos, 
Klingebiel and Laeven (2003).  14 
determine the depth, breadth and efficiency of the financial system.   While the efficiency of 
financial institutions is reflected in interest spreads and margins, one has to consider the 
underlying causes in order to formulate sensible policy lessons. Profit-maximizing financial 
institutions aim to provide financial services in a cost-effective manner, but subject to two 
important constraints: the competitive environment and the general institutional framework.  
Over the past years, financial institutions around the globe have developed new products (simple 
transaction account), new delivery channels and methods (correspondent banking, mobile 
branches, phone and e-finance), new lending techniques (group lending, non-traditional 
collateral), and new screening methodologies (credit scoring) with direct repercussions for 
overhead costs and spreads.  Many of these innovations have also helped expand the universe of 
the bankable population.  
   While technology certainly has played an important role, it is competitive pressure, 
which at the end pushes financial institutions to be more efficient, and it is here that we can 
identify a first important role for government. Allowing or even encouraging entry by sound and 
prudent new institution, whether they be domestic or foreign, is important to maintain 
contestability. Creating a level playing field by avoiding that privately-owned banks benefit from 
government-owned banks’ need to earn higher spreads, helps increase efficiency and outreach.     
Looking beyond the commercial banking system and allowing competition from the non-bank 
financial sector can be important.  Avoiding segmentation in the financial sector through 
expanding access to the payment system or the credit information sharing system beyond the 
commercial banks to banklike institutions such as cooperatives or regulates MFIs can help the 
financial system stay competitive.   15 
  These market-enabling policies, however, find their limit in constraints imposed by the 
institutional and macroeconomic environment.  Market-developing policies, i.e. policies 
addressing deficiencies in the contractual and informational frameworks and policies maintaining 
macroeconomic stability can have important medium- to long-term repercussions for the 
efficiency with which financial institutions operate.  Beyond the financial system, the cost of 
doing business can impose important constraints.   
  A proper and careful analysis of a country financial system cannot only help identify 
deficiencies, but can also help policy maker prioritize.  What is the binding constraint on 
financial institutions to become more efficient and thus to help deepen and broaden the financial 
system? If it is lack of competition, market-enabling policies fostering contestability, are called 
for.  If it deficiencies in the contractual and informational frameworks, reforms in these areas are 
at a premium.  If the problem is part of wider problems of high costs of doing business, then they 
should be addressed.  16 
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Table 1: Spread decomposition for Kenyan Banks 
  All banks  State-owned banks  Domestic private  Foreign banks 
Average deposit rate  3.2  19.8  17.2  17.7 
Average lending rate  18.1  2.9  4.7  2.2 
Overhead cost  5.6  4.4  5.3 6.6 
Loan loss provisions  2.5  4.9  1.5  1.8 
Reserve requirements  0.3  0.3  0.4  0.2 
Tax 1.9  2.2  1.6  2.1 
Profit margin  4.5  5.2  3.7  4.9 
Total spread  14.9  16.9  12.5  15.5 
 
Source: Beck and Fuchs (2004) and author’s calculations using data from the CBK. All data are for 2002. 
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